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THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM
Bradford R Clark*
INTRODUCTION
In the article giving rise to this Symposium, I argued that the
Supremacy Clause safeguards federalism by conditioning supremacy
on adherence to precise lawmaking procedures prescribed elsewhere
in the Constitution.' These procedures were designed to preserve the
governance prerogatives of the states both by making federal law rela-
tively difficult to adopt and by assigning lawmaking solely to actors
subject to the political safeguards of federalism. 2 The Supremacy
Clause recognizes only three sources of law as "the supreme Law of
the Land"-the "Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties" of the United
States.3 Not coincidentally, the Constitution prescribes precise proce-
dures to govern the adoption of each of these sources of law, and all
of these procedures specifically require the participation of the Senate
or the states. 4 These procedural safeguards of federalism were central
to the crucial compromise reached between the small and large states
at the Convention concerning the structure of the new Constitution.
© 2008 Bradford R. Clark. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* William Cranch Research Professor of Law, George Washington University
Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I thank A.J. Bellia, Bill
Eskridge, Beth Garrett, John Manning, Justice Antonin Scalia, Peter Strauss, Carlos
Vdzquez, and Ernie Young for their insightful contributions and comments; Jonathan
Bond for excellent research assistance; and Brian Morrissey, David Raimer, and the
members of the Notre Dame Law Review for proposing this Symposium and for their
dedication in preparing it for publication.
1 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L.
REv. 1321 (2001).
2 The "political safeguards of federalism" refer to the role of the states "in the
composition and selection of the central government." Herbert Wechsler, The Politi-
cal Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543-44 (1954).
3 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
4 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. V; id. art. VII.
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The smaller states demanded and received equal suffrage in the Sen-
ate in exchange for their support of the Constitution. 5 Equal suf-
frage-in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause and federal
lawmaking procedures-gave smaller states (acting through the Sen-
ate) disproportionate and perpetual power to block all forms of "the
supreme Law of the Land" or to exact compromise as the price of
agreement.
6
This Essay primarily responds to several important questions
raised by Peter Strauss and Carlos Vdzquez. First, it addresses Profes-
sor Strauss' suggestion that the phrase "Laws of the United States," as
used in the Supremacy Clause, should be interpreted to refer to fed-
eral common law. This Essay next responds to suggestions that
upholding the procedural safeguards of federalism is no longer possi-
ble in light of developments since the Founding. Specifically, both
Professors Strauss and Vdzquez point to the rise of the administrative
state as evidence that the procedural safeguards are now more or less
obsolete. The Supreme Court's failure to enforce the nondelegation
doctrine supports this hypothesis. In such cases, the Court believes
that it lacks institutional competence to distinguish between permissi-
ble and impermissible delegations. Even if such institutional concerns
prevent the judiciary from enforcing the procedural safeguards in all
respects, however, it does not follow that the safeguards should be
abandoned entirely. To the contrary, in many areas, courts properly
continue to limit or eschew federal lawmaking outside the Supremacy
Clause. Permitting the federal government to circumvent the proce-
dural safeguards of federalism freely would fundamentally alter the
character of the Constitution and would be unfaithful to the crucial
founding-era compromises built into the document.
5 See Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1425-31 (2008).
6 I agree with Carlos Vdizquez that, strictly speaking, federal lawmaking proce-
dures safeguard the status quo by constraining both adoption and repeal of federal
law. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1340 n.90; Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Separation of
Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1601, 1604-08 (2008).
The important point, however, is that the small states' insistence on equal suffrage in
the Senate, and the Senate's inclusion in all procedures governing the adoption of
"the supreme Law of the Land," give small states a disproportionate say in any pro-
posed change in existing law. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1371 ("As the founders recog-
nized, [the Constitution] guarantees small states-acting through their Senators-
disproportionate and perpetual power to block proposed provisions of the 'Constitu-
tion,' 'Laws,' and 'Treaties' of the United States.").
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I. FEDERAL LAWMAKING AND THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE
In his characteristically thoughtful and insightful contribution to
this Symposium, Professor Strauss challenges my reading of the
Supremacy Clause and the central idea that the compromises built
into the constitutional structure should inform the way we interpret
and apply the Constitution today. For Professor Strauss, the compro-
mise that gave rise to the constitutional structure is an interesting his-
torical artifact, but not something that today's judges should follow
rigorously when deciding cases. 7 The reason is that the underlying
structural compromise is static and, in his view, courts should inter-
pret the Constitution dynamically in a common law fashion. 8 For this
reason, he suggests that courts should discount the negative implica-
tion of the Supremacy Clause and the absolute veto that it gives the
Senate (and the states) over the adoption of all forms of "the supreme
Law of the Land."9 Upholding the compromise underlying the
Clause, he believes, would be too constraining and undermine impor-
tant aspects of modern government.10 As I will suggest, however,
respecting the constitutional structure need not be treated as an all-
or-nothing proposition. Rather, in many areas, courts continue to
limit judicial discretion in order to uphold the procedural safeguards
of federalism. And properly so. Courts could not disregard the com-
promises written into the Constitution without also undermining the
legitimacy of judicial review itself.
A. "The Laws of the United States"
Before turning to Professor Strauss' case for structural dynamism,
I briefly address his understanding of the original meaning of the
Supremacy Clause compromise. He argues that the Supremacy
Clause's use of the phrase, "the Laws of the United States," does not
refer solely to "Laws" adopted in accordance with the procedures set
forth in Article I, Section 7.11 He acknowledges that all initial drafts
of the Clause were clearly so limited, but points out that the text was
7 See Peter L. Strauss, The Perils of Theory, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567, 1568
(2008) ("[I]n my judgment, we cannot afford to have contemporary constitutional
understandings of [the constitutional] text governed by the particular theoretical
understandings that may have animated the choice of those words.").
8 See id. at 1574-79.
9 See id. at 1588-92.
10 See, e.g., id. at 1590-91 (calling rulemaking by federal agencies "the predomi-
nant source of federal law today").
11 See id. at 1568-73.
2oo8] 1683
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
changed during the Convention to its current form. 12 As originally
proposed, the Clause referred to "the legislative acts of the United
States made by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of Union."'
13
The Committee of Detail rephrased this as "[t]he Acts of the Legisla-
ture of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution.
'" 14
Late in the Convention, John Rutledge of South Carolina, who
chaired the Committee of Detail, proposed rephrasing the Clause to
add "[t]his Constitution" to the list of "supreme Law," and to change
"[t] he Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance
of this Constitution" to "the laws of the U.S. made in pursuance
thereof."15 The Convention unanimously approved this proposal
without discussion or debate.
16
Professor Strauss suggests that this change in language was more
than stylistic. In his view, "[ t] his 'Laws' might refer to anything with
the status of law," including "common law precedent or administrative
regulations." 17 In support, he observes that "when the Supremacy
Clause later refers in the very same sentence to the 'Laws of any State,'
this second use of 'Laws' embraces state common law."18 The implica-
tion is that if the phrase, "Laws of any State," refers to state common
law, then the phrase, "Laws of the United States," must refer to federal
common law. As he puts it: "As a matter of text-reading, it is hard to
give differing meanings to the same word, endowed with the same
number and the same capitalization in the same sentence of a single
paragraph."'19 Although Professor Strauss makes a nice textual argu-
ment about the potential meaning of the Clause, the historical con-
text in which the words were used strongly suggests that those who
drafted and ratified the Constitution would have understood "Laws of
the United States" to refer solely to statutes adopted in accordance
with Article I, Section 7's requirement of bicameralism and
presentment.
First, consider Professor Strauss' suggestion that, as used in the
Supremacy Clause, the phrase "Laws of any State" was meant to refer
12 See id. at 1568.
13 Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21, 22 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [herein-
after FARRAND'S RECORDS].
14 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 13, at 177, 183.
15 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (Aug. 23, 1787), in 2
FARRAND'S RECORDS, supra note 13, at 384, 389.
16 Id. (reporting that the proposal "was agreed to, nem: contrad").
17 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1568.
18 Id. (footnote omitted).
19 Id. at 1568-69 (footnote omitted).
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to state common law.20 The premise underlying this suggestion lacks
strong historical support. As John Ferejohn and Larry Kramer have
explained, in the modern era "we think of the common law as a
power. '2 1 "The eighteenth-century view was different. Then, the
common law was seen as a distinct field of law ... "22 It followed from
the eighteenth-century understanding that "a political society could
choose to 'receive' the common law's body of principles for itself, but
doing so required an express positive political act in its constitution or
by way of legislation. '2 3 Accordingly, the Supremacy Clause does not
refer to the "Laws of any State" in isolation. Rather, the full reference
is to "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding. '24 Understood in historical context, this phrase did
not refer to the common law directly, because such law was never
thought to be intrinsically state law. Rather, the common law applied
in the states only to the extent that it had been received by a state's
constitution or statutes-the very sources specified by the Supremacy
Clause.
25
In any event, even if one could interpret the phrase, "Laws of any
State," in isolation to refer to state common law, it would not follow
that the distinct phrase, "Laws of the United States... made in Pursu-
20 See id. at 1568.
21 John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1027 (2002).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
25 As Professors Ferejohn and Kramer noted, "[U]pon declaring their indepen-
dence, eleven of the original thirteen colonies immediately adopted 'receiving stat-
utes' expressly incorporating the common law as state law." Ferejohn & Kramer,
supra note 21, at 1027 n.307; see also Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its
Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. Rv. 791, 798-99 (1951). The twelfth state,
New Jersey, included a similar provision in its Constitution of 1776. See id. at 799.
Only Connecticut is problematic because the common law was not adopted by posi-
tive law-the state had no receiving statute and did not adopt a written constitution
until 1818. Even there, however, the unwritten constitution was understood to permit
judicial incorporation of the common law only "so far as it corresponds with our cir-
cumstances and situation." I ZEPHANIAH Swivr, A SYSTEM OF THE LAws OF THE STATE
OF CONNECtiCUT 1 (photo. reprint 1972) (1795); see id. ("A common law peculiar to
ourselves, resulting from our local circumstances, has been established by the deci-
sion of our courts; but has never been committed to writing."); see also Wilford v.
Grant, 1 Kirby 114, 116-17 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) ("The common law of England
we are to pay great deference to, as being a general system of improved reason, and a
source from whence our principles of jurisprudence have been mostly drawn: The
rules, however, which have not been made our own by adoption, we are to examine,
and so far vary from them as they may appear contrary to reason or unadapted to our
local circumstances, the policy of our law, or simplicity of our practice . . . ").
2oo8] 1685
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ance" of the Constitution,2 6 should be read to encompass federal com-
mon law. The Constitution does not specify how states make "Laws,"
and there is no federal constitutional requirement that states follow
the Constitution's model of separation of powers and checks and bal-
ances. That is why Erie declared that "whether the law of the State
shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court
in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. '27 By contrast, it is a
matter of federal concern how the United States makes its "Laws."
28
The Constitution prescribes precise procedures governing how fed-
eral "Laws" are to be adopted, and these procedures implement cru-
cial compromises built into the constitutional structure. The
Founders settled on these procedures only after serious debate and
consideration of various alternatives. The procedures they established
require bicameralism passage by the House and Senate as well as pre-
sentment to the President. 29 If these procedures were not meant to
be exclusive and federal judges were free unilaterally to adopt "Laws"
within the meaning of the Supremacy Clause, then the Founders' bit-
ter and protracted fight over the states' equal suffrage in the Senate
30
would seem rather silly in retrospect.
Second, independent of whether "Laws of any State" refers to
state common law, the particular phrasing of the Supremacy Clause
appears to foreclose any suggestion that "Laws of the United States"
was meant to refer to federal judge-made law. The Clause refers not
merely to "Laws of the United States," but to "Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance" of "[t] his Constitution. ' 3 1 At
the time the Clause was written, lawyers understood the common law
to be discovered rather than made by judges.3 2 If the delegates had
meant to include common law as "the supreme Law of the Land," they
would not have chosen the language they used. According to Black-
stone, the common law existed independent of judicial decisions and
was based on "natural justice" and "the established custom of the
realm. '3 3 Thus, although "'the decisions of courts of justice are the
26 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
27 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
28 For example, few would suggest that federal common law could satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement that "[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
29 See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
30 See Clark, supra note 5, at 1425-31.
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
32 See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1780-1860, at 4-9 (1977).
33 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *70-71.
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evidence of what is common law,"' Blackstone recognized that "the
law, and the opinion of the judge are not always convertible terms, or
one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that the
judge may mistake the law."3 4 When such "mistakes" are discovered,
Blackstone explained, "the subsequent judges do not pretend to make
a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. '35
This conception of the common law persisted well into the nineteenth
century until it was overthrown by the rise of legal positivism and legal
realism. 36 In short, when the Supremacy Clause was adopted, the
Founders would not have understood the phrase, "Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance" of "[t]his Constitution," to
refer to common law. Unlike statutes, such law was understood at the
time to be discovered rather than "made."
Third, the historical context in which the Supremacy Clause was
adopted counsels strongly against Professor Strauss' reading. The
small states fought vehemently at the Convention to secure equal suf-
frage in the Senate and to replace the congressional negative with the
Supremacy Clause.3 7 They sought these changes in order to provide
themselves with a means of defense against federal overreaching.3 8
They understood the Supremacy Clause to further that goal because it
recognized only sources of law adopted with the participation and
assent of the Senate. Professor Strauss' contrary interpretation of the
Clause would require us to conclude that these states suddenly had a
change of heart and were willing to be bound by laws over which they
had no say. We would have to conclude, in other words, that they
were willing to permit the federal government to make unlimited
quantities of supreme federal law without the assent of the Senate and
outside the precise lawmaking procedures so carefully crafted by the
Convention. And it requires us to believe that the Convention could
have made such an important substantive shift without triggering a
single word of protest from delegates who just weeks earlier had
threatened to walk out of the Convention and form a separate confed-
34 Id. at *71 (emphases omitted).
35 Id. at *70 (emphasis added).
36 For example, echoing Blackstone,Justice Story famously declared on behalf of
the Court that the decisions of courts "are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are;
and are not of themselves laws." Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). The
Court's subsequent recognition that state courts actually do make common law on
behalf of their respective sovereigns undoubtedly contributed to the Erie Court's con-
clusion that the Swift doctrine was unconstitutional. See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertain-
ing the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L.
REv. 1459, 1493-95 (1997).
37 See Clark, supra note 5, at 1425-35.
38 See id. at 1428-30, 1433.
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eration if the small states were not given equal suffrage in the Senate
as a means "of self-defence. '3 9 Against this background, the Conven-
tion's decision to replace "Acts of the Legislature of the United States"
with "Laws of the United States" is best understood as merely a stylistic
change.
Finally, contrary to Professor Strauss' suggestion, Article III does
not support-but tends to contradict-the conclusion that the phrase
"Laws of the United States" was understood to include federal judge-
made law. The language used by Article III to confer "arising under"
jurisdiction is virtually identical to the language of the Supremacy
Clause.40 The Supremacy Clause establishes a rule of decision for
courts resolving conflicts between state and federal law. The Clause
declares that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land."'41 State judges take an oath to
uphold the Constitution (including the Supremacy Clause) ,42 but the
Founders were not content to rely solely on the good faith of state
judges to enforce the supremacy of federal law. Instead, in language
closely tracking the Supremacy Clause, they gave federal courts juris-
diction to hear "all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority. '43 As James Liebman and Wil-
liam Ryan have observed, "[T]he parallel language of the 'Arising
Under' and Supremacy Clauses was intentional and structurally cru-
39 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1
FARRAND'S REcoRDs, supra note 13, at 461, 461; see Clark, supra note 5, at 1428.
40 See Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 103 (2003).
41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
42 See id. art. VI, cl. 3.
43 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. As I have previously explained, the difference between
the language of Article III and the Supremacy Clause is small, but instructive. See
Clark, supra note 40, at 103-04. Both provisions refer to "the Laws of the United
States," but only the Supremacy Clause adds the qualification "made in Pursuance" of
this Constitution. This difference reflects the distinct functions that the two provi-
sions were meant to perform. Article III establishes the jurisdiction of federal courts
to hear cases arising under "the Laws of the United States." Jurisdiction is not depen-
dent on whether such "Laws" were "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. Rather,
any federal "Law"-even if unconstitutional-can trigger arising under jurisdiction.
The Supremacy Clause performs the distinct function of establishing a rule of deci-
sion to be applied by courts once jurisdiction is established. See id. at 104.
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cial"4 4 because it "add [s] a yet stronger (because independent, final,
and effectual) external check on state judges.
45
If Professor Strauss were correct that the Supremacy Clause's ref-
erence to "the Laws of the United States" was meant to encompass
judge-made law, then Article III's identical reference to "the Laws of
the United States" would have been understood from the beginning
to confer jurisdiction over cases arising under judge-made law. In
fact, the founding generation did not share this view, and the
Supreme Court did not endorse such jurisdiction until the well into
the twentieth century.46 At several points, Professor Strauss also
invokes admiralty law to support his interpretation. 47 The Court's
traditional understanding of such law, however, cuts decidedly the
other way. Although the Court has long applied general maritime law
("the law merchant") in admiralty cases, it did not regard such law
either as giving rise to federal question jurisdiction under Article III
or as binding in state court under the Supremacy Clause for most of
our constitutional history.
For example, in 1828, Chief Justice Marshall considered on
behalf of the Court whether a case arising under "the law, admiralty
and maritime, as it has existed for ages [and] applied by our Courts" is
a case arising "under the Constitution or laws of the United States. '48
After quoting the language of Article III conferring jurisdiction over
these two categories of cases, Marshall explained:
The Constitution certainly contemplates these as . . .distinct
classes of cases; and if they are distinct, the grant ofjurisdiction over
one of them, does not confer jurisdiction over either of the other
two. The discrimination made between them, in the Constitution,
is, we think, conclusive against their identity. If it were not so, if this
were a point open to inquiry, it would be difficult to maintain the
proposition that they are the same. A case in admiralty does not, in
fact, arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
49
44 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 708
(1998).
45 Id. at 771-72; see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article I11 "Arising
Under" Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 292-317 (2007) (explaining that, in light of the
Constitution's framing and ratification history, Article III "arising under" jurisdiction
is best understood as providing an important, if limited, means of ensuring the
supremacy of federal law).
46 See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972).
47 See Strauss, supra note 7, at 1569, 1579, 1586-87.
48 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545-46 (1828).
49 Id. at 545.
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In other words, the Marshall Court did not consider general maritime
law to be part of "the Laws of the United States" within the meaning of
Article 111.50
Nor did the Supreme Court historically regard general maritime
law as part of "the Laws of the United States" within the meaning of
the Supremacy Clause. The Court finally took this step during the
Lochner era in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,51 but the Court was closely
divided and the decision was controversial even at that time.52 Justice
McReynolds wrote the majority opinion and declared that no state law
is valid if it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of
the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.."
53
Justice Holmes dissented and issued his famous rebuke: "The com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate
voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified ....
It always is the law of some State .... 5 4 Although longstanding, the
Court's modern approach has not gone unchallenged. 55 As recently
as 1994, Justice Stevens protested that "Jensen is just as untrustworthy a
guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York would be in a
case under the Due Process Clause.
'56
50 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), decided four
years earlier, also implied that principles of general law were not "Laws of the United
States" within the meaning of Article III. Osborn addressed whether a case brought by
the Bank of the United States arose under the act of Congress establishing the Bank
and defining its capacities when the outcome of the case turned on general principles
of equity. See id. at 819-23. The Court held that so long as a federal law "forms an
ingredient" of the original cause, "it is in the power of Congress to give [inferior
federal courts] jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it." Id. at 823. This holding confirms that the Marshall Court did
not consider general law to be part of the laws of the United States; otherwise, there
would have been no need for the extended discussion of whether the case arose
under the statute establishing the Bank. See Bellia, supra note 45, at 332-40.
51 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
52 See Robert Force, An Essay on Federal Common Law and Admiralty, 43 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 1367, 1384-87 (1999) (describing Jensen as "infamous" and "much maligned").
53 Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216.
54 Id. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
55 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1245, 1354-60 (1996) (arguing that many modern rules governing private
maritime cases are difficult to square with the constitutional structure); see also Ernest
A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999) (explaining that the
Court's approach since Jensen is inconsistent with Erie and the constitutional
structure).
56 Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 458 (1994) (Stevens,J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
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These developments confirm that the Founders did not antici-
pate preemptive federal common law of the kind that Professor
Strauss has in mind. That is because federal common law is a modern
phenomenon. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that the Foun-
ders understood the Supremacy Clause to encompass federal judge-
made law. Rather, taken in historical context, "the Laws of the United
States . . .made in Pursuance of' the Constitution referred solely to
federal statutes adopted in accordance with the procedures set forth
in Article I, Section 7.
B. Historical Practice
Apart from his textual argument, Professor Strauss maintains that
by the middle of the nineteenth century, one can find several
instances ofjudicial "lawmaking in a Supremacy Clause context."57 As
examples, he cites common lawmaking in admiralty and under the
dormant Commerce Clause.58 In addition, he discounts the signifi-
cance of the Supreme Court's repudiation of both federal common
law crimes and the Swift doctrine. 59 Upon examination, however,
these examples tend to confirm, rather than disprove, the Founders'
understanding that the Supremacy Clause did not encompass federal
judge-made law.
1. Federal Common Law Crimes
After the Constitution was ratified, federal judges initially
embraced federal common law crimes. 60 Indeed, during the Wash-
ington and Adams administrations, almost all Supreme Court Justices
endorsed the practice while sitting on the circuit courts.61 Only Jus-
tice Chase questioned "[w] hether the Courts of the United States can
punish a man for an act, before it is declared by a law of the United
States to be criminal."62 Ironically, the practice came under greater
scrutiny after Congress enacted the Sedition Act of 1798,63 which
57 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1579.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 1581-82.
60 See Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the Eighth
Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1149, 1171-74 (2006).
61 See id.
62 United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 384, 394 (Chase, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (emphasis omitted). He concluded that it is "as essential, that Con-
gress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be
inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the criminal, or to pronounce a sen-
tence on conviction." Id.
63 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
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made it a federal crime to "write, print, utter or publish ... any false,
scandalous and malicious" words about Congress or the President.
64
Thomas Jefferson and his supporters saw the Act as an attempt to
silence political opposition and initially attacked the statute both as
beyond Congress' enumerated powers and as a violation of the First
Amendment. 6 5 Federalists countered that the Act posed no constitu-
tional difficulty because the federal courts already had power to pun-
ish seditious libel as a common law offense. 66 In fact, they argued, the
Act was more protective of individual liberty than the common law
because it allowed truth as a defense.
6 7
This defense sparked a national debate over the legitimacy of fed-
eral common law, and the issue figured prominently in the presiden-
tial election of 1800 between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. 68
Jefferson rejected the Federalist position on both federalism and sepa-
ration of powers grounds:
Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by the federal
government, the novel one, of the common law being in force &
cognizable as an existing law in their courts, is to me the most formi-
dable. All their other assumptions of un-given powers have been in
the detail. The bank law, the treaty doctrine, the sedition act, alien
act, the undertaking to change the state laws of evidence in the state
courts by certain parts of the stamp act, &c., &c., have been solitary,
unconsequential, timid things, in comparison with the audacious,
barefaced and sweeping pretension to a system of law for the
[United States], without the adoption of their legislature, and so
infinitely beyond their power to adopt.
69
A few months later, James Madison made the same two points in
a report issued by the Virginia legislature. First, Madison rejected any
suggestion that "the common law [is] adopted or recognised by the
Constitution. ' 70 A contrary conclusion, he explained, would mean
that the authority of Congress would no longer be limited to the pow-
ers marked out in the Constitution but would be "co-extensive with
64 Id. § 2, 1 Stat. at 596.
65 See Clark, supra note 60, at 1175.
66 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 149 (1995).
67 See Clark, supra note 60, at 1175-76.
68 See David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1712
(1991).
69 Letter from ThomasJefferson to Edmund Randolph (Aug. 18, 1799), in 7 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 1795-1801, at 383, 383-84 (Paul Leicester Ford ed.,
N.Y., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1896).
70 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 341, 382 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906).
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the objects of common law."71 Second, Madison pointed out that fed-
eral incorporation of the common law "would confer on the judicial
department a discretion little short of a legislative power" because fed-
eral courts would have to decide what parts of the common law to
apply.72 Giving federal judges this degree of discretion "over the law
would, in fact, erect them into legislators."
73
Jefferson won a close presidential election (based partly on this
issue), in what he later described as "the revolution of 1800."74 With
his election, the question of federal common law receded into the
background. In 1806, however, a United States Attorney (presumably
without Jefferson's approval) brought a federal prosecution against
two Federalist editors, Hudson and Goodwin, for common law sedi-
tious libel. 75 When the case reached the Supreme Court, it held in a
brief opinion that federal courts cannot "exercise a common law juris-
diction in criminal cases." 7 6 With obvious reference to the Sedition
Act controversy, the Court noted that "[a]lthough this question is
brought up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we
consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion.
77
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "It]he legislative authority of
the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it,
and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.
78
Professor Strauss argues against reading Hudson & Goodwin as a
broad repudiation of federal common lawmaking power. In his view,
the decision "stand [s] only for the Article III proposition that the
jurisdiction of lower federal courts must be legislatively conferred."
79
It is true that the Court's opinion often speaks in terms ofjurisdiction,
but it also contains the broader language quoted above. 80 Reading
the entire opinion in historical context, moreover, suggests that Pro-
fessor Strauss' interpretation is too narrow. The question raised dur-
ing the Sedition Act controversy and "long since settled in public
71 Id. at 380.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 381.
74 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 12
THE WORKS OF TiOMAS JEFFERSON 135, 136 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905).
75 See Clark, supra note 60, at 1177.
76 United States v. Hudson (Hudson & Goodwin), 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32
(1812).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 34.
79 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1580.
80 See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
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opinion"8' was not a technical question of statutory jurisdiction; it was
the constitutionality of federal common law crimes generally.
In any event, the scope of the decision in Hudson & Goodwin was
soon tested and the Court's disposition of the case confirms that it
had decided more than a question of statutory jurisdiction. In United
States v. Coolidge,8 2 Justice Story (sitting as a Circuit Justice) upheld a
federal common law prosecution for forcibly rescuing a prize.8 3 Story
began by establishing the court's statutory jurisdiction. He stressed
that section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 expressly provided "that
the circuit court 'shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States.' "84 In
Story's view, this jurisdiction could not "have been given in more
broad and comprehensive terms,"85 and was not limited to "all crimes
and offences specifically created and defined by statute."8 6 In addi-
tion, he pointed out that the offense in this case-forcibly rescuing a
prize-was one in admiralty, and that "all offences within the admi-
ralty jurisdiction are cognizable by the circuit court."87 Thus, in
Story's view, the circuit court unquestionably had jurisdiction in this
case.
Justice Story next sought to challenge the broader holding of
Hudson & Goodwin by arguing that the exercise of the court's jurisdic-
tion "must, in the absence of positive law, be governed exclusively by
the common law."8 8 Justice Story "considered the point, as one open
to be discussed, notwithstanding the decision in U.S. v. Hudson,"
because that decision was "made without argument, and by a majority
only of the court."8 9 Responding to constitutional objections raised
during the Sedition Act crisis, Story denied that permitting federal
81 Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
82 25 F. Cas. 619 (Story, CircuitJustice, C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857), rev'd, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816).
83 See id. at 621-22.
84 Id. at 619 (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78).
85 Id. at 620.
86 Id. at 619. The Supreme Court did not cite or discuss section 11 of the Judici-
ary Act in Hudson & Goodwin, even though that provision appeared to confer broad
criminal jurisdiction on the circuit courts. This omission suggests that the Court used
the term "jurisdiction" in a broader, nontechnical sense in its opinion dismissing the
prosecution-a suggestion confirmed by the Court's subsequent decision in Coolidge.
See infra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
87 Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. at 622.
88 Id. at 620.
89 Id. at 621. Justice Story also pointed out that Hudson & Goodwin, "however
broad in its language," did not settle "the question now before the court, so far as it
respects offences of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Id.
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courts to recognize federal common law crimes would give them
unconstrained discretion or exceed federal power. Rather, he argued
that the "crimes and offences against the United States" could be
determined by reference to "the principles of the common law, taken
in connexion with the constitution."90 Applying this approach, Story
identified several of the crimes he had in mind. "Without pretending
to enumerate them in detail, I will venture to assert generally, that all
offences against the sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice,
the public peace, the public trade and the public police of the United
States, are crimes and offences against the United States." 91 In Story's
view, the crime of forcibly rescuing a prize fell squarely within these
categories.
When Coolidge reached the Supreme Court, the Attorney General
declined to argue the case in part because he had examined the opin-
ion in Hudson & Goodwin and considered "the point as decided in
that case." 92 No counsel appeared for the defendant, but the Court
nonetheless instructed the circuit court to dismiss the indictment on
the authority of Hudson & Goodwin.93 Although several Justices
(including Story) expressed their willingness to reconsider that prece-
dent,94 the Court simply declared that in the absence of argument
"the court would not choose to review their former decision in the
case of the United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, or draw it into
doubt. '95 Taken together, the Court's decisions in Hudson & Goodwin
and Coolidge establish that the judiciary lacks constitutional power to
recognize and enforce federal common law crimes. Moreover, these
decisions provide important early evidence thatjudicial recognition of
federal common law crimes, at least, could not be squared with the
constitutional structure.
2. General Common Law
Professor Strauss points to the law of admiralty as an example of
nineteenth-century federal common lawmaking "in a Supremacy
Clause context."96 In support, he quotes a passage from The Lot-
tawanna,97 which includes the statement that in extending the judicial
power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
90 Id. at 620.
91 Id.
92 United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 415-16 (1816).
93 See id. at 416-17.
94 See id. at 416.
95 Id.
96 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1579.
97 88 U.S. 558 (1875).
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diction, it is "unquestionable" that "the Constitution must have
referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly
in, the whole country." 98 He fails to mention, however, that the Court
went on to deny judicial power to make or alter that preexisting sys-
tem of maritime law, and actually upheld the application of state law
to the question before the Court. On the first point, the Court stated:
But we must always remember that the court cannot make the
law, it can only declare it. If, within its proper scope, any change is
desired in its rules, other than those of procedure, it must be made
by the legislative department. It cannot be supposed that the fram-
ers of the Constitution contemplated that the law should forever
remain unalterable. Congress undoubtedly has authority under the
commercial power, if no other, to introduce such changes as are
likely to be needed. 99
On the second point, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding rule of
The General Smith100 that, "so long as Congress does not interpose to
regulate the subject, the rights of material-men furnishing necessaries
to a vessel in her home port may be regulated in each State by State
regulation." 10 1 Thus, properly understood, The Lottowanna does not
establish-but tends to refute-the proposition that federal courts
had broad federal common lawmaking power in admiralty cases to
displace state law.
As discussed, the equation of admiralty law with federal common
lawmaking had to await the Supreme Court's decision in Jensen in
1917.102 Prior to that time, the general maritime law in cases of admi-
ralty and maritime jurisdiction operated much like the general law
applied by federal courts in diversity cases during the Swift era.
10 3 It
applied in federal court (as an incident of jurisdiction), but was not
binding in state court as "the supreme Law of the Land."'1 4 In Jensen,
the Court established the first true example of federal common law by
declaring that admiralty law preempts contrary state law.1 0 5 Two
decades later, however, the Court's approach to general law in diver-
98 Id. at 575.
99 Id. at 576-77.
100 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819).
101 The Lottowanna, 88 U.S. at 580; see also id. at 581 ("It would undoubtedly be far
more satisfactory to have a uniform law regulating such liens, but until such a law be
adopted (supposing Congress to have the power) the authority of the States to legis-
late on the subject seems to be conceded by the uniform course of decisions.").
102 See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
103 See Clark, supra note 55, at 1347-48.
104 See id.
105 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1917).
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sity cases was very different. Instead of federalizing such law, the Erie
Court denied the existence of "federal general common law" and
declared that "the course pursued" by federal courts during the Swift
era had been unconstitutional 106
Professor Strauss finds my reliance on Erie unpersuasive because
he reads the opinion to stand only for the relatively narrow proposi-
tion that "federal courts cannot independently make common law
where Congress cannot legislate."10 7 He acknowledges that "Con-
gress ... could have legislated a special rule to govern interstate rail-
roads" and that such a rule would have sufficed to resolve cases like
the one before the Court. I0 8 He stresses, however, that "[t]he Court
was being invited to consider the general rule, not a special rule for
interstate entities." 0 9 In other words, because (and only because)
Congress lacked constitutional power to adopt such a general rule,
federal courts were also without power to do so.
For several reasons, this reading cannot account for Erie. First, if
Congress could have legislated a special rule for cases like the one at
bar, then it would follow under Professor Strauss' approach that the
Court could have adopted a special (as opposed to general) rule for
such cases as well. Yet the Court did not do so. Rather, it remanded
the case for the application of state law. 010 And recall that the Court
took this action even though it meant that the injured plaintiff would
be governed by state law (which appeared to impose only a minimal
duty of care),"' as opposed to federal judge-made law (which
imposed an ordinary duty of care).1 12 One suspects that if the Court
had believed that it had the option of adopting a special duty of care
for interstate railroads, then it would have done so.
Second, Professor Strauss' focus on a single sentence in the
Court's opinion suggesting a lack of congressional power'" discounts
106 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
107 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1571.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See Eie, 304 U.S. at 80.
111 See id. at 70 (recounting the Railroad's argument that under Pennsylvania law,
"the railroad is not liable for injuries to undiscovered trespassers resulting from its
negligence, unless it be wanton or wilful"). The Court did note that the parties dis-
puted the duty of care under Pennsylvania law and left this question to be decided on
remand. See id. at 80.
112 See id. at 70 (recounting the court of appeals' application of an ordinary duty
of care under general law).
113 Professor Strauss highlights a sentence from the Court's opinion that does
indeed focus on the limits of congressional power: "Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their
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other more salient portions of the opinion. 114 As he acknowledges,
the Court began its constitutional analysis by declaring that "[e]xcept
in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Con-
gress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."' 1 5 As I
have argued elsewhere, this sentence essentially paraphrases the effect
of the Supremacy Clause and presupposes that federal courts have no
independent lawmaking authority to displace state law. 116 In addi-
tion, throughout its opinion, the Court stressed that the Constitution
requires the application of state law in this case-whether such law
was "declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a
decision."' 17 Under Professor Strauss' contrary approach, the Court
could have displaced state law unilaterally so long as Congress had
power to do so (whether or not it used such power). Given the
Court's recent Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Congress undoubt-
edly had such power.'1 8 Nonetheless, the Erie Court held emphati-
cally that the Constitution required federal courts to follow state law.
Third, Professor Strauss' reading of Erie would raise the very fed-
eralism and separation of powers problems identified by Madison in
connection with the Sedition Act controversy.1 19 Allowing courts to
adopt federal common law whenever Congress has power to legislate
would mean either that federal courts could preempt state law in all
such cases-an incredible proposition given the modern scope of the
commerce power' 2 0-or that they would have discretion to pick and
choose when to do so. As Madison pointed out, however, giving fed-
nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or part of the law of torts." Id. at 78; see
Strauss, supra note 7, at 1571. As I have argued elsewhere, however, this sentence is at
best dictum (because no federal statute was at issue), and at worst simply wrong
(given the expansion of the commerce power already well underway). See Bradford
R. Clark, Erie's Constitutional Source, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1289, 1298-99 (2007).
114 The very next sentence, for example, indicates that the Court was at least as
concerned with separation of powers as federalism: "And no clause in the Constitu-
tion purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
115 Id.
116 See Clark, supra note 113, at 1308.
117 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also id. at 79 (stating that the "fallacy underlying the
rule declared in Swift v. Tyson" is "that federal courts have the power to use their
judgment as to what the rules of common law are"); id. ("' [T] he authority and only
authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice adopted by the State as its own
(whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court) should utter the last word."'
(quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans-
fer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
118 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937).
119 Madison, supra note 70, at 381.
120 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (upholding a federal statute
criminalizing intrastate possession of medical marijuana).
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eral courts this degree of discretion "over the law would, in fact, erect
them into legislators." 12 1 There is no indication that Erie endorsed
this result. To the contrary, a fair reading of the opinion confirms
Henry Monaghan's assessment that Erie "recognizes that federal judi-
cial power to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of
dormant congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to some
source, such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional provision, as author-
ity for the creation of substantive federal law."
1 22
3. The Dormant Commerce Clause
Professor Strauss also invokes the dormant Commerce Clause as
an example of nineteenth-century federal common lawmaking.1 23 It
is worth noting at the outset that if the Commerce Clause itself over-
rides state law even in the absence of congressional regulation, then
giving effect to the Clause is not only consistent with, but required by,
the Supremacy Clause. 124 The Clause recognizes not only "the Laws
of the United States," but also "[t]his Constitution" as "the supreme
Law of the Land."'125 More fundamentally, even if one regards judicial
enforcement of the dormant Commerce Clause as a form of judicial
lawmaking, the doctrine tells us little about the original constitutional
structure. The Supreme Court did not begin striking down state laws
solely on the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause until the latter
half of the nineteenth century. 126 In addition, then as now, many
regarded the doctrine as improper judicial activism. 127 Indeed, the
121 Madison, supra note 70, at 381.
122 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
11-12 (1975).
123 See Strauss, supra note 7, at 1583-84.
124 Professor Strauss regards the dormant Commerce Clause as judicial lawmaking
in a constitutional context "beckoning the Court beyond the plain words of the Con-
stitution's text." Id. at 1579. If the Constitution's text and structure do not authorize
judicial lawmaking in this context, then such lawmaking is inconsistent with the
Supremacy Clause. See Bradford R. Clark, Translating Federalism: A Structural Approach,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1161, 1180-87 (1998). On the other hand, if one concludes
that the Commerce Clause in fact authorizes judicial invalidation of state law, then by
definition such action is consistent with the Supremacy Clause.
125 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
126 See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 588-90
(1886).
127 Compare The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847) (opinion of
Taney, C.J.) (maintaining that "the mere grant of power to the general government
cannot.. . be construed to be an absolute prohibition" of state regulation, and that a
state may "make regulations of commerce for its own ports and harbours, and for its
own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of
Congress"), with Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 263
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rise of the dormant Commerce Clause roughly corresponded with the
rise of economic substantive due process. Thus, it should come as no
surprise that within the span of just a few months the New Deal Court
decided to overrule Swift,128 abandon economic substantive due pro-
cess, 129 and rein in the dormant Commerce Clause. 130 All three doc-
trines, the Court came to realize, allowed federal courts to disregard
state law with no clear warrant in the Constitution, Laws, or Treaties of
the United States.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCUTURE
Professors Strauss and Vdzquez suggest that the procedural safe-
guards of federalism spelled out in the Constitution have limited, if
any, significance today. In their view, the rise of the modern adminis-
trative state not only makes it impossible to enforce the procedural
safeguards in that context, but also counsels disregarding such safe-
guards more broadly as a kind of compensating adjustment.
Although it may no longer be possible to enforce the procedural safe-
guards of federalism fully in all contexts, they continue to play a signif-
icant role in constraining the means by which the federal government
may make "the supreme Law of the Land." Because these safeguards
are so carefully spelled out in the Constitution and were so central to
its adoption, courts could not read them out of the document and still
remain faithful to their oath to uphold "this Constitution."
131
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The historical record
provides no grounds for reading the Commerce Clause to be other than what it says-
an authorization for Congress to regulate commerce."). For further discussion, see
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE LJ. 569, 572 ("Our federal constitutional
democracy prohibits the unrepresentative federal judiciary from invalidating deci-
sions of the state legislatures except when authorized by some provision or combina-
tion of provisions of the Constitution, or when clearly contrary to congressional
action. Absent textual foundation the dormant [commerce] clause cannot stand,
regardless of whatever valuable social economic or political policies the concept
might be thought to foster." (footnote omitted)).
128 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
129 SeeW. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-400 (1937). On the rela-
tionship between economic substantive due process and general common law under
Swift, see Michael G. Collins, Before Lochner-Diversity Jurisdiction and the Development
of General Constitutional Law, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1263, 1299-320 (2000).
130 See S.C. State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938) (stat-
ing that "so long as the state action does not discriminate, the burden is one which
the Constitution permits because it is an inseparable incident of the exercise of a
legislative authority, which, under the Constitution, has been left to the states").
131 See Clark, supra note 5, at 1431-35.
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A. The Administrative State
Professor Strauss suggests that treating the Supremacy Clause as
the exclusive source of the supreme law of the land "would unhinge
too much of our constitutional tradition and understanding." 132 In
particular, he fears that administrative preemption of state law pursu-
ant to vague statutory commands might not survive close Supremacy
Clause scrutiny. 133 Broad agency preemption, however, is a relatively
recent phenomenon. The practice has become increasingly contro-
versial, moreover, precisely because of the growing sense that funda-
mental policy decisions about health, safety, and the environment are
being made by unelected officials without adequate safeguards.
13 4
Accordingly, as Bill Eskridge explained at this Symposium, broad
Chevron deference-which greatly facilitates agency preemption-may
not be appropriate where Congress has not clearly delegated preemp-
tive authority to the agency.1 3 5 Reassessing how the Chevron doctrine
applies in this context might slow or alter agency preemption in some
cases, but it would not fundamentally alter the administrative state.
Professor Strauss also suggests that my understanding of the
Supremacy Clause would necessitate abandoning "the delegation doc-
trine as we know it in any context impacting state law." 136 To be sure,
the Supremacy Clause and the exclusivity of federal lawmaking proce-
dures counsel in favor of the Court's traditional stance that Article I
"permits no delegation of [legislative] powers."'137 In practice, how-
ever, the Court enforces only a weak version of the nondelegation
doctrine because of its limited institutional competence. The reason
the Court has not enforced a more vigorous nondelegation doctrine is
that it has "'almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left
to those executing or applying the law. '""1 38 The judiciary feels con-
132 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1598.
133 See id. at 1589-91.
134 See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REv. 737, 759-78
(2004); Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.
REv. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 13-30), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1030626; Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federal-
ization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. Rrv. 227, 251-58 (2007).
135 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1441 (2008).
136 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1591.
137 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); see also Touby v.
United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991) (stating that "Congress may not constitution-
ally delegate its legislative power to another branch of Government").
138 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)); see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the
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strained in this context because, generally speaking, there is no bright
line, judicially administrable test for distinguishing (permissible) law
execution from (impermissible) lawmaking.' 3 9
The absence of aggressive judicial enforcement of the nondelega-
tion doctrine, however, should not be confused with constitutional
acquiescence. 40 As Cass Sunstein points out, courts employ certain
canons of construction that "actually constitute a coherent and flour-
ishing doctrine, amounting to the contemporary nondelegation doc-
trine. 1 4 1 In addition, when the Court can determine with confidence
that Congress has authorized the executive branch to engage in law-
making rather than law execution, it has not hesitated to invalidate
delegations of lawmaking power to the President. For example, in
Clinton v. City of New York, 142 the Court struck down the Line Item
Veto Act1 4 3 on the ground that it gave "the President the unilateral
power to change the text of duly enacted statutes. 1 44 In most
nondelegation cases, the Court's limited institutional competence
leads it to err on the side of viewing executive action taken pursuant
to congressional authorization as permissible execution of the law.
Several unusual features of the Line Item Veto Act, however, allowed
the Court to conclude that the cancellation provisions gave the Presi-
dent lawmaking power in violation of "Article I, § 7, of the Constitu-
tion." 145 Accordingly, as in INS v. Chadha,146 the Court concluded
Role of Structure in Constitutional Interpretation, 96 CAL. L. REV. 699, 716-17 (2008);John
F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1544
(2008).
139 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1373-78.
140 But see Vdzquez, supra note 6, at 1636 (suggesting that because "constitutional
limits on such delegations are not judicially enforceable," the "Court today acquiesces
in supreme federal lawmaking by a single agency").
141 Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 317 (2000); see
also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine
for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2000) (observing that "[t]he
Court has used clear-statement rules and the canon of avoidance as surrogates for the
nondelegation doctrine").
142 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
143 Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
144 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 446-47.
145 Id. at 448. As I have recently explained:
The Act gave the President only a single opportunity to cancel eligible
items within five days of their enactment, and cancellation was permanent.
Ordinarily, when Congress assigns broad discretion to the executive branch,
it remains free to act at any time during the life of the statute to reverse
course concerning the best way to execute the statute. By making the Presi-
dent's cancellation irreversible, the Act authorized a change in the law as
opposed to a mere change in the implementation of the law. In addition,
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that Article I, Section 7 establishes the exclusive means of enacting,
amending, and repealing federal statutes.
14 7
B. Interpretive Method
Professor Vdzquez nonetheless suggests that "the combination of
doctrinal change through stare decisis and the need for doctrinal
coherence may properly lead to a broader rejection of' adherence to
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures. 148  Given the
Supreme Court's inability to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, he
argues that "faithfulness to the original design may require additional
departures from the original structure."1 49 In his view, "compensating
changes" are needed to prevent us from moving "further from the
Founders' goals."15 0 One such adjustment "may require that accept-
ance of broad delegations to the executive be matched by acceptance
of some forms of legislative vetoes."'1 5 1 More broadly, Vdzquez sug-
gests that "we must look at th [e original] structure at a high level of
generality, and we will need to adjust the original features of that
structure in a way that best accomplishes the Founders' broad goals in
the light of entrenched changes in the legal landscape since the
Founding.
'15 2
In this context, such translation raises several concerns. Encour-
aging courts to uphold otherwise unconstitutional statutes in order to
recreate some theoretical founding balance may itself be inconsistent
with the distinct founding balance concerning the respective roles of
the judiciary and the political branches. 15 3 As Larry Lessig, upon
whose work Vazquez relies, has acknowledged, sometimes "[t]he
Court gives up one practice (translation), which aims at preserving a
permanent cancellation authority overrides a clear legislative outcome
rather than implementing a compromise that leaves ambiguity.
Clark, supra note 138, at 719 (footnote omitted); see Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438 (conclud-
ing that the Act permitted the President to amend "two Acts of Congress by repealing
a portion of each"); Lawrence Lessig, Lessons from a Line Item Veto Law, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1659, 1662 (1997) (noting that the Act's conferral of a "negation" power
made it "perhaps the only case that is an easy case under the non-delegation
doctrine").
146 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
147 See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438-40; Chadha, 462 U.S. 945-51.




152 See id. at 1636-37 (citing Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States
v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 125, 213).
153 See Clark, supra note 124, at 1164.
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particular aspect of the Constitution's original meaning, because it
holds onto another aspect of the Constitution's original meaning-
namely, an aspect defining its institutional role.
1 5 4
More fundamentally, whatever may be said for pursuing "the
Founders' broad goals" "at a high level of generality" in other con-
texts, this approach seems singularly inappropriate in this context.
The constitutionally prescribed procedures governing the adoption of
all forms of "the supreme Law of the Land" are among the most pre-
cise and detailed provisions in the original Constitution. Such preci-
sion alone suggests that courts should not use abstract purposes or
principles to override specific procedures spelled out in the text.'
55
In addition, the precise provisions governing supremacy, the Senate,
and federal lawmaking procedures were the very means of implement-
ing the central founding-era compromise between the small and large
states-a compromise without which the Constitution would not have
been proposed or ratified. 156 These "features of the constitutional
structure are spelled out so carefully ... and were so central to the
creation of the federal system that they cannot be read out of the
[Constitution] without fundamentally altering its character."
1 57
Professor Strauss' prescription for preemptive federal lawmaking
outside the carefully crafted procedures specified in the Constitution
raises similar concerns. He proposes "a dynamic approach to constitu-
tional interpretation-one that sees as the judicial task understanding
and enforcing constitutional text in a manner that, embodied with its
general spirit, finds that meaning best suited both to continuity with
established understandings and to the exigencies of the present."'
158
He uses Freytag v. Commissioner 59 to illustrate the difference between
his approach and mine. Specifically, he compares my approach to
Justice Blackmun's "effort to return to the Convention's particular
understanding" and his approach to Justice Scalia's effort to resist this
approach.160 With all due respect, I think he has things backwards.
154 Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Federalism's Text, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1218,
1222 (1998).
155 See John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitu-
tional Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1701-20 (2004) (examining the procedures for adopt-
ing and amending the Constitution and urging courts to follow precise constitutional
texts rather than contrary purpose or intent).
156 See Clark, supra note 5, at 1424-35.
157 Id. at 1439.
158 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1574.
159 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
160 Strauss, supra note 7, at 1574-79.
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Freytag considered whether the Chief Judge of the Tax Court is
one of the "Heads of Departments" in whom the Appointments
Clause permits Congress to vest the appointment of inferior
officers. 16 1 Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court invoked the pur-
pose of the Clause to confine "Departments" to cabinet-level depart-
ments in light of changed circumstances. 16 2 According to Justice
Blackmun, the Appointments Clause "reflects our Framers' conclu-
sion that widely distributed appointment power subverts democratic
government." 163 "Treating the Tax Court as a 'Department' and its
Chief Judge as its 'Hea[d]' would defy the purpose of the Appoint-
ments Clause,"' 64 he argued, because the modern proliferation of
executive departments "would multiply indefinitely the number of
actors eligible to appoint." 65 By contrast, "[c]onfining the term
'Heads of Departments' in the Appointments Clause to executive divi-
sions like the Cabinet-level departments constrains the distribution of
the appointment power."
166
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia disagreed. He pointed out that
the "term 'Cabinet' does not appear in the Constitution,"'16 7 and he
saw no textual or historical basis for a "distinction between Cabinet
and non-Cabinet agencies."'168 Rather, in his view, text, history, and
precedent all "support the proposition that 'Heads of Departments'
includes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President in
the organizational structure of the Executive Branch." 169 Because the
Chief Judge of the Tax Court fit this description, Congress could vest
him with power to appoint inferior officers.
170
Unlike Justice Blackmun, I do not advocate relying on the Consti-
tution's general background purpose to (re)interpret the document
in light of changed circumstances. Rather, like Justice Scalia in
Freytag, I am simply suggesting that we continue to respect the rela-
tively precise provisions of the constitutional text-in this case, the
Supremacy Clause, constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures,
and the states' equal suffrage in the Senate-even in the face of
changed circumstances. Professor Strauss, by contrast, seems to favor
161 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882-88.
162 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 886-87.
163 Id. at 885.
164 Id. at 888.
165 Id. at 885.
166 Id. at 886.
167 Id. at 916 (Scalia, J., concurring).
168 Id. at 918.
169 Id.
170 See id. at 901, 920-22.
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elevating the "general spirit" of the Constitution over its precise terms
in order to accommodate changed circumstances.' 7' This approach
more closely resembles Justice Blackmun's approach in Freytag than
Justice Scalia's. Thus, like Professor Vdzquez's prescription, Professor
Strauss' interpretive method would read the small states' dispropor-
tionate power in the lawmaking process out of the Constitution.
C. Doctrinal Implications
Professor Vdzquez suggests that the procedural safeguards of fed-
eralism "should carry no doctrinal weight."1 7 2 Specifically, he main-
tains that "the constitutional structure does not support doctrinal
rules that reflexively favor the status quo in the event of textual ambi-
guity." 73 Examples of such rules include the presumption against
preemption, 174 clear statement rules, 75 and "the Court's current
restrictive approach to the implication of private rights of action. ' 176
Vdzquez argues that "[b] ecause the constitutional structure reflects a
balance between the status quo and change, it does not support the
conclusion that ambiguities in the text must be resolved against
change.1 77 While I agree that it would "be illegitimate for the courts
to impose obstacles to federal lawmaking not contemplated in the
Constitution," 78 Vdzquez is too quick to conclude that the constitu-
tional structure provides courts with no interpretive guidance. 179
The Constitution is not indifferent between state and federal law.
State law is background law.180 It applies unless-by operation of the
Supremacy Clause-it is displaced by the "Constitution," "Laws," or
"Treaties" of the United States. 181 As Henry Hart explained, state
courts of general jurisdiction have authority "over all persons and mat-
ters within the state's power," and "have. . . at their command a theo-
retically complete set of answers for every claim of breach of private
171 See Strauss, supra note 7, at 1574.
172 Vdzquez, supra note 6, at 1607.
173 Id. at 1625.
174 See id. at 1627-28.
175 See id. at 1607-08.
176 Id. at 1624.
177 Id. at 1625.
178 Id. at 1611.
179 See id. at 1625 ("The constitutional structure, as such, cannot supply the con-
tent of ... interpretive rules.").
180 See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 543 (explaining that the Founders "preserved the
states as separate sources of authority and organs of administration" rather than abol-
ish them in favor of a consolidated central government).
181 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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duty that might be brought before them."' 82 Federal law, by contrast,
is interstitial in nature.183 The federal government has limited powers
and may adopt "the supreme Law of the Land" only by employing
precise, constitutionally prescribed procedures. As discussed, all of
these procedures require the participation of the Senate or the states,
and thus give small states disproportionate power in the lawmaking
process.' 84 As a general rule, therefore, federal courts must follow
state law unless and until the federal government is able to adopt con-
trary law using such procedures. This is what the Erie Court meant
when it declared: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Consti-
tution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the
law of the State." 18
5
If state law is background law and the federal government can
make "the supreme Law of the Land" only by employing procedures
that favor small states, then courts are right to apply doctrines that
guard against over-preemption of state law. The traditional presump-
tion against preemption 186 performs this function by ensuring compli-
ance with constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures. If a
federal statute does not expressly preempt state law, then a judicial
decision to preempt risks circumventing the procedural safeguards of
federalism built into the Constitution. The Court's restrictive
approach to implied private rights of action is defensible on similar
grounds. As Professor Vdzquez recognizes, "legislation is never
unidimensional, but rather is always the product of compromise."'
187
Thus, a statute's failure to include a private right of action may reflect
compromise and the constraints of the legislative process. Were
courts to recognize implied rights of action freely, they might produce
182 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 492 (1954).
183 See id. at 498 ("The federal law which governs the exercise of state authority is
obviously interstitial law, assuming the existence of, and depending for its impact
upon, the underlying bodies of state law.").
184 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
185 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); see Clark, supra note 138, at
701-06.
186 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that when
Congress legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied," courts
"start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress").
187 Vdzquez, supra note 6, at 1629.
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statutes that could not have been enacted with the assent of all neces-
sary veto players.
188
On the other hand, I agree with Professor Vdzquez that it is "ille-
gitimate to engraft additional requirements for the creation of
[supreme federal] law or to subtract from the preemptive force of
federal law once made." 189 Properly conceived, however, the assorted
interpretive presumptions that implement the procedural safeguards
of federalism merely seek to ensure that the decision to preempt-
and the scope of the preemption-fairly reflect a congressional choice
rather than an exercise of lawmaking discretion by an actor not sub-
ject to the specified safeguards. To be sure, that line may not always
be an easy one to draw.190 But it is worth noting that many staples of
interpretive doctrine outside the federalism context rest squarely on
the presupposition that a meaningful-and meaningfully identifi-
able-line exists between a statute that speaks directly to a question
and one whose vagueness or ambiguity on a point leaves a decision to
Congress. That idea is, of course, a central premise of the Chevron
doctrine. 19I It is also reflected in the well-settled doctrine that courts
188 Professor Vdzquez suggests that at the time of the Founding, "rights of action
for statutes not explicitly addressing the question would have been supplied by the
common law," and that "the common law was thought to have a separate existence"
from state law at the time. Id. at 1631. He suggests, therefore, that federal courts
engaged in federal common lawmaking when they interpreted the common law to
provide a private right of action. See id. As discussed, however, the common law
applied in the United States was state law at the time of the Founding and only
applied by virtue of the states' reception of such law. See supra notes 20-25 and
accompanying text.
189 Vazquez, supra note 6, at 1604; see Bradford R. Clark, Process-Based Preemption,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE (William W. Buzbee ed., forthcoming Oct. 2008).
190 For an extended discussion of this concern, see Manning, supra note 138.
191 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
In Chevron, the Court held that a reviewing court must first ask whether Congress "has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842. As the Court added, "If
the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id.
at 842-43. Conversely, if the statute is vague or ambiguous on the interpretive point
in question, then the reviewing court must accept the agency's interpretation as long
as it is "permissible" or "reasonable." See id. at 843-44. The commonly accepted rea-
son for this distinction is that in the latter case, the interpretation reflects the product
of the agency's policymaking discretion-an exercise over which the agency has a
claim of greater legitimacy and relative institutional competence. See, e.g., Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 307-08 (1988) (laying out the now-standard account
of Chevron). This framework, of course, presupposes a meaningful distinction
between clear congressional choice and ambiguity that gives rise to agency lawmaking
discretion.
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will not typically resort to legislative history when a statute is clear. 192
And it is the cornerstone of perhaps the most venerable canon of con-
struction-the rule of lenity. 193 In other words, courts must and do
sort between clear and ambiguous statutes, between congressional
choice and interpreter discretion, all the time.
My only point is that many of the doctrines that have survived the
advent of the modem administrative state attempt to push lawmaking
upward into processes that are subject to the political safeguards of
federalism. That impulse, I submit, fits comfortably with-and may be
compelled by-the clear structural implications of the Supremacy
Clause and the lawmaking procedures that it embraces. Thus, prop-
erly conceived, the relevant presumptions and clear statement rules
merely operate to "ensure[] the efficacy of the procedural political
safeguards."1
94
Finally, Professor Strauss seems to suggest that the rise of the
modern administrative state has rendered structural features like the
Supremacy Clause and federal lawmaking procedures largely irrele-
vant. To be sure, constitutional interpretation is a complex process.
At any given time, particular judicial interpretations will conform
more or less to the constitutional structure. Some combination of
stare decisis, historical practice, and the limits of judicial competence
may dissuade the Court from fully implementing particular aspects of
the constitutional structure in a particular context. For example, as
discussed, the procedural safeguards of federalism argue in favor of
greater judicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine. 195 The
judiciary's limited institutional competence, however, makes that
course highly unlikely.1
96
192 See, e.g., Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994) ("[W]e do not
resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear"); Barnhill v. Johnson,
503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) (" [A] ppeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve
,statutory ambiguity."' (quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991))).
193 See, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (emphasizing
that lenity requires that "ambiguous criminal statute[s] ... be construed in favor of
the accused"); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971) (noting that lenity pro-
motes the ideal that "legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity").
194 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 5-11, at 877 (3d ed.
2000). Thus, as Caleb Nelson has noted, it would be improper for courts to apply an
"artificial presumption against preemption" to constrain "federal statutory provisions
that plainly do manifest an inten[t] to supplant state law." Caleb Nelson, Preemption,
86 VA. L. REv. 225, 232, 291 (2000) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
195 See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text. This does not mean, however,
that courts should abandon judicial review under the nondelegation doctrine. To the
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The constitutional structure, however, remains relevant to other
questions because it provides a valuable source of constitutional
meaning. Thus, when the Court confronts a novel or unsettled ques-
tion, it properly takes the structure into account.1 9 7 As I tried to show
in my original article, many of the Court's most famous constitutional
decisions can only be fully understood in light of the structural impli-
cations of the Supremacy Clause.1 9 8 For example, the procedural
safeguards of federalism may illuminate the Court's seemingly incon-
sistent approaches in separation of powers cases. As Professor Strauss
has previously observed:
The Supreme Court has vacillated over the years between using a
formalistic approach to separation-of-powers issues grounded in the
perceived necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of gov-
ernment (and consequently appearing to draw rather sharp bound-
aries), and a functional approach that stresses core function and
relationship, and permits a good deal of flexibility when these
attributes are not threatened.1 99
This apparent inconsistency has led some scholars to conclude that
"the Supreme Court's treatment of the constitutional separation of
powers is an incoherent muddle."20 0 Recognizing the relationship
between separation of powers and federalism, however, helps to rec-
oncile the Court's seemingly inconsistent approaches.
20 1
contrary, judicial review of agency action may be "part of the price of legitimating
broad delegations of power." John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 893, 913 (2004); see also Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION 320 (1965) ("The availability ofjudicial review is the necessary condition, psy-
chologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be
legitimate, or legally valid.").
197 See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1639 (2008) (suggesting ways to make federal common law more consistent with
the Supremacy Clause and the procedural safeguards of federalism).
198 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1372-93 (discussing congressional compliance with
federal lawmaking procedures); id. at 1393-403 (discussing executive compliance
with federal lawmaking procedures); id. at 1403-30 (discussing judicial compliance
with federal lawmaking procedures).
199 Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Ques-
tions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489 (1987) (footnote omitted).
200 Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1517 (1991); see also Martin H. Redish & ElizabethJ. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern".
The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE LJ. 449, 450
(1991) (stating that "[i]n the separation of powers area ... the modern Court has
evinced something of a split personality, seemingly wavering [between formalism and
functionalism]").
201 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1391-93.
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Many of the Supreme Court's leading formalist decisions can be
understood as upholding the Constitution's carefully crafted proce-
dures for adopting "the supreme Law of the Land."20 2 Examples
include Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,203 INS v. Chadha,20 4 and
Clinton v. City of New York. 205 In these cases, the Court used a rather
formal approach to invalidate attempts by Congress and the President
to circumvent the requirements of bicameralism and presentment. 206
Many of the Court's famous functionalist decisions-such as Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,207 Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion v. Schor,208 and Morrison v. 01son2 9-did not involve circumven-
tion of federal lawmaking procedures. Rather, they considered the
distinct question whether Congress had unduly interfered with the
functions of a coordinate branch. 210 Recognizing that strict adher-
ence to the formal lawmaking procedures prescribed by the Constitu-
tion is necessary to preserve the Senate's veto over "the supreme Law
of the Land" (and the small states' disproportionate power in the law-
making process) lends greater coherence to the Court's disparate
approaches in separation of powers cases. In other words, formalism
sometimes functions to uphold the exclusivity of federal lawmaking
procedures and the procedural safeguards of federalism.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution preserves the governance prerogatives of the
states not only by limiting the substantive lawmaking powers of the
federal government, but also by prescribing precise lawmaking proce-
dures that frequently render the federal government incapable of
exercising its powers. By including the Senate, these procedures give
small states disproportionate power in the lawmaking process to block
or alter federal proposals. The Supremacy Clause reinforces these
procedural safeguards by recognizing only three sources of law-the
202 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
203 (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952) (invalidating President Truman's
attempt to seize steel mills during the Korean conflict).
204 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983) (invalidating the legislative veto).
205 524 U.S. 417, 447-49 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act).
206 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1391-92 (discussing Chadha and Clinton as examples
of formalism).
207 433 U.S. 425, 429-30, 483-84 (1977) (upholding statutory restrictions on for-
mer President Nixon's access to presidential papers and effects).
208 478 U.S. 833, 847-58 (1986) (upholding the Commodities Futures Trading
Act).
209 487 U.S. 654, 685-97 (1988) (upholding the Independent Counsel Act).
210 See Clark, supra note 1, at 1391-92.
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"Constitution," "Laws," and "Treaties"-as "the supreme Law of the
Land." Not coincidentally, constitutionally prescribed lawmaking pro-
cedures require the participation and assent of the states or their rep-
resentatives in the Senate in order to adopt each of these sources of
law. Article V further entrenches the small states' advantage in the
lawmaking process by providing that no state shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate without its consent. Taken together,
these procedural safeguards of federalism were the price that the
small states exacted at the Constitutional Convention in exchange for
their support of the new Constitution. Stare decisis, historical prac-
tice, and the limits of judicial competence may prevent courts from
upholding these safeguards in every instance. Fidelity to both the
Constitution and the compromises it reflects, however, precludes
courts from reading the precise provisions governing federal lawmak-
ing and supremacy out of the document.
